Original Text

μέμνησο, ὅτι ὀρέξεως ἐπαγγελία ἐπιτυχία, οὗ ὀρέγῃ, ἐκκλίσεως ἐπαγγελία τὸ μὴ περιπεσεῖν ἐκείνῳ, ὃ ἐκκλίνεται· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐν ὀρέξει ἀποτυγχάνων ἀτυχής, ὁ δὲ ἐν ἐκκλίσει περιπίπτων δυστυχής.

Transliteration

orexeōs epangelia epitychia, ekkliseōs epangelia to mē peripesein

Translation

Remember that the promise of desire is to obtain what you desire, and the promise of aversion is not to fall into what you shun; and the one who fails to get what he desires is unfortunate, while the one who falls into what he shuns is wretched. If, then, you shun only those things contrary to nature that are within your power, you will fall into none of the things you avoid. But if you try to avoid sickness, or death, or poverty, you will be wretched.

So remove aversion from everything not in our power, and transfer it to the things contrary to nature that are in our power. As for desire, for the present give it up entirely; for if you desire any of the things not in our power, you are bound to be unfortunate, and meanwhile none of the things in our power that it would be good to desire is yet within your reach. Use only impulse toward and away from things — but lightly, with reservation, and without straining.

Commentary

If chapter 1 maps the territory, chapter 2 hands you the first tool for walking it — and it begins with a sharp piece of vocabulary. Every desire (orexis) and every aversion (ekklisis) carries a promise (epangelia): desire promises you will get the thing; aversion promises you will escape it. A faculty that breaks its promise leaves you in one of two states. Aim desire at what you cannot control and fail to get it, and you are atychēs — unfortunate, missing the mark. Aim aversion at what you cannot escape — sickness, death, poverty — and fall into it anyway, and you are dystychēs — wretched, undone.

Epictetus's prescription is staged, and the staging matters. Aversion can be retrained immediately: pull it back from all externals and aim it only at what is genuinely up to you and contrary to your nature — your own vice, cowardice, dishonesty. You will never "fall into" those against your will, so aversion aimed there always keeps its promise. Desire, by contrast, he tells the beginner to suspend entirely for now. This is a counterintuitive and humbling instruction: not "desire better things" but "stop desiring for the present." The reason is developmental — the student has not yet so purified his judgment that the things worth desiring (virtue, a will in harmony with nature) are reliably within reach. Until then, premature desire just reattaches to externals through the back door.

The final clause supplies the tone for the entire practice: act through impulse "lightly, with reservation, and without straining" (kouphōs, meth' hypexaireseōs, aneimenōs). The Stoic does not become a stone. He still moves toward and away from things — he simply does so with a built-in reservation, the inner clause "if nothing prevents." This is engagement without grasping.

Cross-Tradition Connections

The phrase "with reservation" (hypexairesis) is one of Stoicism's most quietly profound contributions, and it has a close cousin in the Vedic teaching of action without attachment to fruits (Bhagavad Gita 2.47–48): act fully, surrender the result. In both, the energy goes into the doing while the outcome is held in an open hand. The Stoic acts "if nothing prevents"; the karma-yogi acts and renounces the fruit. Neither is passive; both are unbreakable.

The staged suspension of desire echoes the Buddhist analysis of taṇhā (craving) as the origin of suffering in the second noble truth. The Buddhist path does not ask you merely to crave better objects but to see through the mechanism of craving itself. Epictetus's "for the present, give up desire entirely" is a beginner's version of that disengagement — a temporary fast from wanting, undertaken so the faculty can be retrained rather than indulged.

There is also a parallel in the Christian contemplative tradition's distinction between "willing" and "willingness" — Gerald May's framing of willfulness (gripping life to bend it to our agenda) versus willingness (entering reality on its own terms). The Stoic hypexairesis is structurally willingness: I will do my part and remain open to what actually unfolds.

Universal Application

Notice where your desires and fears are aimed. If they target externals — being liked, being safe from loss, never falling ill — you have handed your peace to forces that owe you nothing. The teaching asks for a quiet but radical redirection: train aversion onto the only thing it can master (your own conduct) and, in the steep early going, loosen the grip of desire altogether rather than let it cling to what it cannot hold.

The lasting principle is the phrase "with reservation." To live well is not to want nothing, but to want everything external conditionally — to reach for the train while accepting, in advance, that you may miss it. The person who internalizes this can pursue, work, and hope without being shattered when the world declines to cooperate.

Modern Application

Try a practical inventory: for one day, catch each strong want or fear and ask what it is promising and whether it can keep that promise. "I want this offer to come through" — can desire deliver an outcome that rests with someone else? No. "I'm afraid of getting sick" — can aversion guarantee you never will? No. Both are promises the faculties cannot keep when aimed at externals, and the disappointment is built in from the start.

Then practice the reservation clause directly. Before any effort whose result you don't control — sending the application, having the hard conversation, planting the garden — add the inner phrase: I'll do this fully, and accept whatever comes. This is not lowering your standards; it is detaching your serenity from the verdict. It parallels the way acceptance-based modern practices teach people to commit to valued action while releasing attachment to outcome — described here as resonance, not as a clinical claim.